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Current Account Imbalances
Within the Eurozone
Tom Augspurger
ABSTRACT. Widening Current Account imbalances were a key feature of the run-up to
the global financial crisis. Within the European Monetary Union, large surpluses and
deficits emerged among member countries. The imbalances were initially viewed as
evidence of the success of the Euro, but they continued to grow and contributed to the
recent financial crisis. The problem of imbalances is still with us today and could hamper
future growth in the deficit countries.

I. Introduction
The early years of this millennium saw large increases in current account
imbalances within the Eurozone. Initially, the imbalances were viewed
as vindication of the Euro’s success; the introduction of the Euro, coupled
with financial-services innovations, allowed capital to flow freer than
ever before among Eurozone countries. Increased capital mobility would
increase welfare for borrowers and financiers alike. Recently, however,
imbalances have been criticized for contributing to macroeconomic
instability and the global financial crisis. It is now evident that much of
the capital inflows to deficit countries went to financing consumption
rather than investment in productive assets.
Going forward, the Eurozone will need to rebalance. Deficit
countries built up large amounts of debt that must be repaid, which will
require future Current Account surpluses. To facilitate this in a time of
depressed global demand, surplus European countries must move toward
deficit to assist in the Eurozone’s rebalancing. The adjustment will be
difficult, made even more so because of monetary union.
I.1 A Brief History of the Euro
At least since the aftermath of World War II, European economic
integration has been a stated goal of European policymakers. They
acknowledged protectionism and nationalist policies as threats to a stable
Europe. The modern European Economic and Monetary Union began to
take shape in 1970 with the Werner Report, which advocated three stages
of economic integration: free capital flows, Central Bank coordination,
23
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and irrevocably fixed exchange rates–embodied, possibly, in a common
currency (Burton 2011).
The treaties regulating Euro area government are numerous; for our
purposes, the two most important are the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and
the Stability and Growth Pact (1997). The Maastricht Treaty founded the
European Union (EU) and enacted Werner’s three-stage process. The
goal was no less than Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the
completion of a single European market. In exchange, countries would
cede some of their sovereignty to the European Union and the European
Central Bank (ECB). Central Banks of member countries would help
achieve the goal by coordinating monetary policy and regulation (EU
2007).
The Stability and Growth Pact was signed to ensure the health of
public finances prior to launching the Euro. Member countries agreed to
limit public deficits to 3% of GDP and public debt to 60% of GDP. Noncompliant members would be subject to sanctions (European Commission
2010). The Stability and Growth Pact aimed to preserve the integrity of
the Union by ensuring that public finances could not degrade limitlessly,
thus jeopardizing the sanctity of the Euro.
In 1999 the Euro was introduced. All of the Eurozone countries
(countries whose official currency is the Euro) discussed here joined in
1999 except Greece, which joined in 2001.
Since the inception of the Euro, a division arose between two sets of
countries. The first set consists of Germany, Austria, Finland, and the
Netherlands, and will be referred to as the “North.” The second set of
countries includes Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain and will be
referred to as the “South” (I’m well aware that if you look at a map
Ireland is north of Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands; don’t blame
me, I didn’t come up with the names). The North is characterized by
large, persistent Current Account surpluses, while the South is
characterized by large, persistent Current Account deficits.
I.2 National Accounts
For our purposes, a country has two important national accounts: The
Current Account (CA) and the Capital Account (KA). Readers
experienced with Balance of Payments accounting can skip this section.
The Current Account Balance reflects the difference between a
country’s exports and imports of goods, services, investment income, and
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unilateral transfers (Yarbrough & Yarbrough 2006, 408). Note that the
Current Account is not composed only of trade in goods and services, i.e.
the Trade Balance; for some models the Current Account is simplified
into the Trade Balance. I’ll warn you when doing so.
The Current Account is composed of a list of credits and debits. An
export (or credit) reflects a unilateral transfer, investment income, or an
inflow of payments in exchange for an outflow of goods or services. An
import (or debit) reflects an outflow. The Current Account is in deficit
if the sum of the credits is less than the sum of the debits (i.e. CA<0
implies a deficit). The reverse is true for a Current Account surplus; the
sum of the credits is greater than the sum of the debits. By way of
example, suppose the U.S. exports $1,000 worth of goods and imports
$1,500 worth of goods; it has a Current Account deficit of $500 (or a
Current Account balance of negative $500). That is, $500 have flown
abroad from the U.S. Now suppose that the U.S. exports an additional
$2,500 worth of services. The total Current Account would then be:
Exports

(Imports)

CA Balance = Exports
minus Imports

$1,000 + $2,500

$1,500

$2,000

All the exports are added together and the imports are subtracted. Note
that the U.S. has moved into surplus because the Current Account balance
is positive.
An example of investment income, one of the components of the
Current Account, is dividends earned from ownership of foreign assets.
For example, suppose a Spanish investor holds stock of Deutsch Bahn,
listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange. A dividend payment would enter
the Spanish Current Account as a credit because it involves a flow of
money from Germany to Spain (just like an export involves a flow of
money into the country). From the German perspective, this same
transaction is represented as a debit because it involves the flow of money
from Germany to Spain. Investment income does not include flows of
new investment, only income from existing investment. Flows of new
investment would show up in the Capital Account, defined next.
The other important national account, the Capital Account (KA),
“records international borrowing and lending and purchases and sales of
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assets” (Yarbrough & Yarbrough 2006, 413). The Capital Account
Balance is the difference between capital inflows and capital outflows.
If inflows are greater than outflows, the Capital Account is in surplus. If
inflows are less than outflows, the Capital Account is in deficit. An
example of a capital outflow is, from the standpoint of the U.S., the
purchase of a foreign asset by a U.S. resident. This transaction would
move the Capital Account into deficit. It’s helpful to think of the
transaction as the U.S. “importing” the title on the asset in exchange for
the outflow of capital.
Because of how the Current Account and Capital Account are
defined, the two must sum to zero. To see why, consider this example:
an Austrian resident exports i1,000 worth of goods to a Spanish resident,
who pays for them with a i1,000 check against a checking account at a
Spanish bank. From the Austrian point of view, the i1,000 export is
entered as a credit in the Current Account, so the surplus is i1,000. The
check obtained by the Austrian exporter represents a capital outflow
(because it is held in a foreign bank), so it is entered in the Capital
Account as a i1,000 debit. The net result of the transaction is a Current
Account of i1,000 and a Capital Account of negative i1,000. To
generalize, Current Account + Capital Account = 0, or alternatively,
Current Account = - Capital Account
For the purposes of this paper, it won’t hurt to view a Current
Account deficit as the country as a whole spending more than it earns.
The excess of spending over income is made possible by an inflow of
capital, captured in the Capital Account. In this sense, the Current
Account is analogous to a person’s checking account. His income
(exports, returns on financial investments–but not on their sale) increases
his balance. Expenditure (imports, interest payments) decreases his
balances. He can run a surplus and lend the excess to a bank (abroad), or
he can run a deficit and borrow from a bank (abroad), or run down
existing savings.
It may also be helpful to think in terms of the National Income
equation:
Y=C+I+G+X-M

(1)

where Y = Income (or GDP), C = private consumption, I = private
investment, G = government purchases of goods and services, X =
exports, and M = imports. The equation can be simplified slightly (one
of those simplifying assumptions I warned about earlier) by solving for
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net exports (CA = X - M).
Y = C + I + G + CA

(2)

The Current Account can be viewed through the lens of the SavingsInvestment relationship. Equation 2 can be rewritten as:
Y - C - G = I + CA

(3)

and (Y - C - G) is simply national Savings (S). So this equation can be
rewritten:
S = I + CA

(4)

or
S - I = CA

(5)

If a country saves more than it invests, it has a Current Account
surplus and a Capital Account deficit.
These accounting identities say nothing at all about the different
behavioral relationships that determine national income and the Current
Account or Capital Account. They are, however, useful for clarifying
one’s thought about where certain actions show up in the economy.
I.3 Current Account Imbalances around the World
The literature on global Current Account imbalances is extensive, so a
brief survey will have to do here. Ben Bernanke’s “global savings glut”
hypothesis (Bernanke 2005) argues that some emerging-market
economies, by deliberately pursing export-oriented growth, created an
excess fund of savings that had to be absorbed by Current Account
deficits in the developed world.
Trouble arises when the deficit countries cannot safely absorb the
capital inflows. Bernanke (2011) highlights two sources of instability:
first, when the “rules of the game” of the international financial system
are not observed (such as when France and the United States kept their
currencies undervalued in the interwar period); and second, when the
financial system cannot productively allocate the capital inflows. The
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second type of instability will be more important for our case study.
There are some traits of Current Account imbalances that are
exclusive to currency unions. These traits, both positive and negative,
will be a recurring theme throughout this paper.
I.4 Current Account Imbalances in the Euro Area
Shortly after the adoption of the Euro (1999 for most countries, 2001 for
Greece), the Current Accounts of the Northern and Southern countries
diverged. The size of the Current Account imbalances increased rapidly
from 2002 until 2008, when the global financial crisis reversed the trend
somewhat. This is shown in Figure 1 (IMF World Economic Outlook
Database 2010). The shaded area indicates a forecast.

The two curves roughly mirror each other, so in aggregate the Current
Account surpluses of the North were more or less canceled out by the
Current Account deficits of the South.
Figure 2 shows the same calculation, but broken into individual
countries (IMF WEO 2010). Again, the shaded area is a forecast.

II. The Classical Explanation
In what I am calling the “Classical” explanation, Current Account
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imbalances are viewed as proof of the success of the Euro. This view is
perhaps best formulated by Oliver Blanchard and Francesco Giavazzi
(2002). In discussing the then already large Current Account deficits of
Portugal and Greece, they note that the deficits
are exactly what theory suggests can and should happen when
countries become more closely linked in goods and financial
markets. To the extent that they are the countries with higher
rates of return, poor countries should see an increase in
investment. And to the extent that they are the countries with
higher growth prospects, they should also see a decrease in
saving. Thus, on both counts, poor countries should run larger
current account deficits. Symmetrically, richer countries should
run larger current account surpluses (Blanchard & Giavazzi
2002).

That is, the Current Account imbalances are a natural consequence of
adopting the Euro. Standard Neoclassical theory predicts that capital
ought to flow to where it is scarcer. The “completion of the single
market” (a common buzz-phrase in Eurocratese) encourages this flow.
Residents of poorer countries, seeing this capital inflow and anticipating
higher future growth, should anticipate higher future incomes and smooth
their consumption by saving less now. The cumulative result is a rise in
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investment and a decline in savings, and thus a Current Account deficit
for the poorer countries.
Monetary Union will encourage larger Current Account imbalances
by removing two major barriers to trade and capital flows: currency risk
and conversion costs. Currency risk refers to the possibility that the
bilateral exchange rate between you and your trading partner can change,
harming your return. In a currency union, nominal exchange rates are
locked at 1:1. The second cost, conversion costs, comes from the need to
exchange domestic currency for foreign currency. For example, in the
past if you lived in Germany and wanted to buy a French good, the French
exporter would want francs, requiring you to exchange Deutsche marks
for francs. This costs both time and money. With the Euro, the need for
currency conversion is removed. Financial innovations facilitate the flow
of capital from creditor to debtor by lowering transaction costs and
exposing savers to new sources of investment and borrowers to new
sources of financing.
Blanchard and Giavazzi concluded that the data supported their
hypothesis: the adoption of the Euro was a success because it had
removed barriers to the flow of capital. The large and sustained Current
Account imbalances were just a natural byproduct of attaining a new
equilibrium.1
Another reason to support a benign view of Current Account
Imbalances is given by the Balassa (1964)-Samuelson (1964) effect. As
incomes and productivity converge, we would expect to see above
average inflation in the Current Account deficit countries. More
openness should lead to productivity gains in the tradable sector of the
poorer countries as capital inflows and increased competition pushes
them to higher productivity. This should lead to an increase in wages. To
the extent that labor is substitutable between the tradable and nontradable sectors, higher wages in the tradable sector will lead to higher
wages in the non-tradable sector. The overall result is an increase in the
price level if the increase in non-tradable wages is greater than the
decrease in prices of tradable goods (Lommatzsch & Tober 2006).
As a country’s price level rises, its exports become less competitive
and more expensive on the international market, while imports become
relatively less expensive. This would encourage more imports and fewer
exports, and so a move toward Current Account deficit. The price level
will eventually settle at a new, higher level. Thus the classical
explanation has a built-in stabilization mechanism; prices and inflation
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will converge as incomes converge. Current Account deficits and above
average inflation are simply byproducts produced by moving to a new
equilibrium (Ayuso et. al. 2004). A policy response is neither required
nor desired.

III. Problems with the Classical Explanation
The first thing to note is that in the decade following the Blanchard &
Giavazzi paper, Current Account imbalances widened. Second, both
Blanchard and Giavazzi, previously exponents of the classical view, have
since altered their position. Blanchard recognized that Current Account
imbalances may be greater than warranted by fundamentals, but stopped
short of encouraging national policy makers to counteract them
(Blanchard 2006). Giavazzi has gone even further and called for policy
reactions to the imbalances noting that, “[t]he current account position[s]
... have always been neglected both in the academic debates on and in the
policy management of the Euro area” (Giavazzi & Spaventa 2010).
Overall, the story has not played out as predicted. Incomes have not
converged, productivity gains have not emerged, and problems that were
largely unforeseen have cropped up in the meantime. I will address these
issues in the sections that follow.
Bear in mind that the causes of Current Account deficits are probably
unique to each country. Ireland had a massive financial crisis, Greece did
not. Spain and Ireland had huge property bubbles, while Portugal did not.
Greece’s public sector was undisciplined, but Spain and Ireland’s were
exemplars. It is probably impossible to list causes and assign weights
proportional to their relative importance in causing deficits (something
some econometric papers have tried to do), without losing some important
nuance along the way. At best, we can recognize factors that probably
had an effect for that time and place and, with any luck, formulate
policies to prevent them in the future.
III.1 The Current Account and Foreign Indebtedness
The Current Account is a flow variable, and the stock into which it flows
is the country’s net foreign investment position. To oversimplify a bit,
the current account is the change in a country’s net foreign investment
position.2 A deficit increases liabilities, while a surplus increases assets.
Figure 3 (Eurostat) shows the net foreign investment position of our eight
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countries (data for Austria is missing from 2002-2005, although their
position seems to have been fairly stable. Sincerest apologies).
As expected, the deficit countries accumulated debt throughout the
decade. Servicing this debt may be difficult for the Southern countries,
especially considering that incomes are disappointingly low.

III.2 Income Convergence
A key assumption in the classical explanation is that the borrowing
associated with today’s Current Account deficit is to be repaid out of
higher future income. Figure 4 (IMF WEO Database 2010) shows the
growth rates in GDP at purchasing power parity from 1990 until 2010.
The growth rate of the South was higher than the North before joining the
Euro. After joining, the growth rates more or less aligned. It would be
rash to say that joining the Euro caused lower growth in the South, but the
classical explanation predicted higher growth in the South, not this.
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If we break that graph into its individual components, the story is
slightly different. Figure 5 (IMF WEO 2010) shows the GDP per capita
of each Southern country relative to the Euro average of the same year,
all at purchasing power parity (note that Spain’s 2009 value is still
preliminary; the rest are forecasts beginning in 2010). A value of one
indicates average GDP per capita.
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The growth of the Irish GDP per capita stands out, and has been
dubbed the “Irish Miracle,” Holding this up as an example of
convergence, however, would be suspect. Irish income already equaled
the Euro average by 1997, well into the monetary union process, but two
years before the Euro became the official currency (Giavazzi and
Spaventa 2010). We’ve also seen that the party, the Current Account
deficits that is, didn’t really start until 2000. Ireland actually had a
modest Current Account surplus until 2000 (IMF WEO 2010). The flow
of capital couldn’t have caused Ireland’s rapid catch-up because it
occurred after Ireland had already caught up.3
While some of the gains Spain made in real income may have been
illusory due to the property bubble, there is no denying that it made some
progress. The real test, however, is yet to come. Spain’s response to its
real exchange rate appreciation, which will be discussed later, will
determine if its income will continue to converge, stagnate, or even
relapse relative to the Euro average.
Greece also (probably) had income convergence. I say probably
because Greek economic statistics should all be taken with an unusually
large grain of salt because the statistics office fabricated data on
government finances. In either case, the IMF is forecasting a decline in
Greek real GDP per capita relative to the Euro average in the coming
years.
Finally, there is Portugal, perhaps the saddest story in this picture.
After a slight increase from 1995 until 2002, real GDP per capita has
declined back to its 1993 level, relative to the Euro average. If nothing
else, this emphasizes the difficulty of forecasting; remember, Portugal
was the evidence Blanchard and Giavazzi used to support the conclusion
that the Euro was encouraging convergence.
III.3 Public and Private Savings
As discussed earlier, a country’s Current Account can be viewed as the
difference between Saving and Investment (CA=S-I). So a Current
Account deficit can arise from, cet. par., an increase in investment or a
decline in savings. The Savings and Investment variables can both be
decomposed into their public and private components:
CA = Spublic - Ipublic + Sprivate - Iprivate
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After joining the Euro, the public net savings of both the Northern and
Southern countries moved toward, though not quite to, surplus. In the
four years prior to monetary union (1995-1998), the South’s public
savings averaged negative 4.00% of GDP and the North averaged
negative 2.94%. From 1999-2008, the South averaged negative 0.96%
while the North averaged negative 1.39% (See Table 1).
TABLE 1–General Government Net Lending or Borrowing
(Percent of GDP)
1995-1998

1999-2008

North

-2.94%

-1.39%

South

-4.00%

-0.96%

IMF WEO Database 2010
Some of the improvement is due to stronger growth, and some is due to
fiscal restraints imposed by the Maastricht Treaty (Holinski 2010). Part
of the improvement was probably exaggerated by housing booms, leading
to higher government revenues than fundamentally warranted. But the
general premise still remains: during the development of Current Account
deficits, Southern public sectors moved toward surplus. Greece is the
black sheep here, having a government deficit of 6.4% of GDP in 2007.
But at least in Portugal, Ireland, and Spain public sector deficits were not
the driving force of growing Current Account deficits, which leaves us
with the private sector.
Here the statistics are remarkable. The North’s private net savings
increased slightly, from an average of 4.2% of GDP to 4.8%. Meanwhile,
the South’s private net savings dropped from an average surplus of 5.0% to
a deficit of 4.7% (Holinski 2010). These data are summarized in Table 2.
TABLE 2–Private Net Lending or Borrowing (Percent of GDP)
1992-1998

1999-2007

North

4.2%

4.8%

South

5.0%

-4.7%

Source: Holinski 2010
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Decomposing the Current Account into its public and private
components showed that, in aggregate, the private sector led the move
toward Current Account deficits in the South. This highlights an
important oversight by the planners of the European Monetary Union:
public deficits were explicitly limited in treaties such as the Stability and
Growth Pact (these limits were largely ignored, but that’s another issue);
private borrowing, which was not addressed, turned out to be the major
destabilizer.
III.4 Interest Rate Convergence
The severe decline in private sector savings was at least partially a
response to the convergence of long-term interest rates within the
Eurozone. Figure 6 (OECD.stat) shows the 10-year government bond
yields (a good proxy for country-wide interest rates) for Portugal, Ireland,
Greece, Spain, relative to the 10-year German bund. A value of zero
indicates that the Southern government can borrow at the same rate as the
German government.

As can be seen, credit spreads narrowed around the time of monetary
union. This represented a large interest rate shock to the Southern
economies because, as Figure 7 (ECB 2011) shows, convergence came
from a fall in Southern rates, not a rise in German rates.
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Effectively, markets were assuming that Greece was just as
creditworthy as Germany (until the financial crisis that is). Lower interest
rates encouraged investment and borrowing. And, as we saw above, the
private sectors of the South responded just as theory said they would.
Savings rates fell while investment rose; Current Account deficits ensued.
III.5 Labor Costs and Productivity
At least since Adam Smith, economists have recognized that productivity
is integral to the wealth of a nation. It was hoped that the Euro would
encourage productivity gains in the periphery countries (especially in the
traded goods sector), bringing their standards up to that of the Northern
core. Figure 8 (Eurostat) shows output per hour worked relative to the
EU average. A value of 100 is average. I’ve included the series for the
South and for the South excluding Ireland, whose labor productivity was
already comparable to the North’s by 2002.
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Overall, there was productivity growth in the South, but the growth
has been slow and the gap is still large.
Figure 9 (OECD.stat) paints a similar picture but in a different way.
It shows the growth rates of labor productivity (percentage change, yearover-year), for Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain relative to the
Northern average. A value of zero indicates the same growth rate as the
North.

Greece and Ireland did enjoy large gains in productivity. In Greece, this
showed up in GDP per capita growth. In Ireland, where productivity was
high to begin with, productivity growth did not keep up with GDP per
capita growth (Giavazzi & Spaventa 2010). Portugal had slightly positive
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productivity growth, although it slowed in the later part of the decade.
Spain more or less had no productivity growth in absolute terms, and slid
backwards against the North.
The literature suggests that a better measure of competitiveness may
be productivity adjusted for Terms of Trade (TOT) effects.4 Ireland is
excluded because of its already high productivity (just another example
that the causes and consequences of Current Account deficits are varied).
Growth Variables (average annual percentage change) 1996-2006
Real
GDP/Capita

Real
GDP/Capita
TOT
Adjusted

Labor
Productivity
TOT
Adjusted

Total Factor
Productivity
TOT
Adjusted

Greece

3.6

3.7

3.0

2.2

Portugal

1.4

1.2

0.9

0.0

Spain

2.6

2.8

0.2

0.1

Euro Area

1.7

1.5

0.6

0.4

Bennett, et al. 2008
Greece had good income and productivity growth; its troubles stem from
other causes. Spain had strong income growth, but the productivity
growth wasn’t there. Portugal had poor growth in productivity and
income. Lack of productivity growth is important for two main reasons.
First, it suggests (though it doesn’t necessarily prove) that the borrowed
funds were not invested in productive assets, a point discussed next.
Second, productivity growth can justify above average inflation
(remember the Balassa-Samuelson effect). We’ll see later that the South
had above average inflation. But above average inflation with below
average productivity growth is troublesome in a monetary union. This
second point is also discussed below.
III.6 The Intertemporal Budget Constraint
A country, like a consumer, can be thought of as having an intertemporal
budget constraint (there are differences, but the analogy helps illuminate
an important concept). The budget constraint says that today’s borrowing
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must be either refinanced (a difficult thing to do in the midst of a financial
crisis), or repaid out of tomorrow’s income. Repayment, for the country
as a whole, requires Current Account surpluses. In our simple model that
means exports must be greater than imports.
It is common to model the intertemporal budget constraint with a two
country, two good model.5 The two (groups of) countries are Current
Account creditors and Current Account debtors. The two (types of)
goods are tradable and non-tradable. Tradable goods can be produced,
bought, and sold (theoretically) anywhere in the world. Non-tradable
goods can only be produced and consumed domestically. This type of
two country, two good model stresses the distinction between investment
in the production of tradable goods and investment in the production of
non-tradable goods; investment in the non-tradable sector will do little to
improve productivity in the tradable sector.
If tradable-sector
productivity is not improved, a debtor country will find it difficult to run
future Current Account surpluses. As Giavazzi and Spaventa note,
an excess of foreign borrowing with the purpose of financing the
production of non-traded goods is incompatible with a budget
constraint... Insofar as non tradable goods by definition can only
be consumed domestically, foreign financing for their production
is equivalent to borrowing abroad for consumption purposes
(Giavazzi and Spaventa 2010, 8).
When put this bluntly, it is easier to see how investment in the nontradable sector will do little to bring about future Current Account
surpluses. And without Current Account surpluses, the net foreign debt
position of a country will only worsen.
Of course, the distinction between tradable and non-tradable goods
is not a sharp one. Should investment in housing count as tradable or
non-tradable? Conceivably, it could be counted as tradable if it’s a
summer home for tourists. But the general point remains: to meet the
intertemporal budget constraint, sufficient investment must be made in the
tradable sector.6
III.7 Monetary Policy and Inflation in a Monetary Union
Recall from earlier that we would expect poorer countries in a monetary
union to experience above average inflation as they catch up, the Balassa-
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Samuelson effect. The mechanism is stiffer competition leading to
increased productivity leading to higher wages and higher inflation. To
a limited extent, the data bears out this view. Inflation differentials have
been relatively mild in Europe since Monetary Union with standard
deviations of around 1%, with poorer countries persistently above the
average, but the data on productivity is far from conclusive.
There is an ongoing debate about the determinants of inflation
differentials within Europe. The Balassa-Samuelson effect views
inflation differentials as benign.7 Others argue that the inflation
differentials are greater than can be explained by the Balassa-Samuelson
effect and propose other causes, some of which are not so benign.8
Whatever the causes, Southern countries have experienced above average
inflation. Figure 10 (Eurostat) shows the Real Effective Exchange Rates
(which accounts for price level changes in both the domestic country and
in its major trading partners) for each of our countries

The two principal variables affected by above average inflation are
the real exchange rate and the real interest rate.
Above average inflation raises a country’s general price level (a real
appreciation), thus making exports more expensive and imports cheaper
on the international market. Residents of the country will therefore import
more and export less, both of which increase a country’s Current Account
deficit. The full implications of this competitiveness loss, as it’s called,
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are discussed below.
The second main effect of higher inflation is a lower real interest rate.
In this sense above average inflation is pro-cyclical, at least up to a point.
Lower real interest rates will stimulate investment and borrowing,
possibly leading to housing booms and debt crises. Additionally,
increased aggregate demand will, cet. par., lead to higher inflation,
exacerbating the competitiveness loss.
III.8 Competitiveness in a Monetary Union
Normally, if a country finds its export sector uncompetitive, it can
devalue its currency. Devaluation lowers the country’s nominal exchange
rate, thus making its exports cheaper and foreign imports more expensive.
The net result is a move toward surplus in the trade balance portion of the
Current Account.
And there’s the problem: in giving up their national currencies to join
the Euro, individual countries also gave up control over their nominal
exchange rates vis-à-vis other Euro countries; the nominal exchange rate
between any two Euro countries is fixed at i1/i1. Nominal devaluation
is by definition impossible.
The Euro can still depreciate in nominal terms against other
currencies. A Euro depreciation, however, is neither desirable nor likely
to succeed. With global demand in the developed world still weak, the
world cannot afford a European Current Account surplus. While an
appreciation of emerging market currencies (like China) against the Euro
could help square this circle, it is not clear if that appreciation is
forthcoming.
The one-size-fits all (or one-size-fits none) monetary policy is a
serious problem for the Eurozone (Augspurger 2010). The European
Central Bank can only target inflation for the currency union as a whole.
Policy makers knew this going into the Euro, but it was hoped that the
benefits of monetary integration would overwhelm any costs arising from
heterogeneity among member-states. In fact, some have argued that
there’s an element of endogeneity in creating a currency union–by
creating a union, disparate countries become more similar (Frankel 1999).
Business cycles, inflation, productivity, and other key macroeconomic
variables would all synchronize. But as we’ve seen, this has not yet
happened.
Not all hope is lost though! At least not in theory. The exchange rate
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that really matters is the real exchange rate. A real devaluation can still
be achieved through lower than average inflation. A country should
simply restrict monetary policy, keep inflation low, and watch its exports
become competitive again... But alas, member countries gave up control
of their monetary policy along with their currency and exchange rate
policy. So there is no hope to achieve a real devaluation through
monetary policy.
“Aha,” you say. “I’ve read my Keynes and he taught me that deflation
needn’t raise employment, especially in a liquidity trap. Your entire
premise that lower costs will increase employment is flawed.” To which
I respond “Well, I’ve read my Einstein and he taught me that everything
is relative.” What the Southern Eurozone countries need is deflation
relative to the North, which will undo some of the price competitiveness
lost over the past decade.
The Southern countries have two ways to achieve the relative
devaluation. If the Northern core of the Eurozone allows above average
inflation, the Southern periphery can regain competitiveness by having
average or below average inflation. This could be achieved by looser
fiscal policy in the core countries. Unfortunately, it’s not clear that
countries like Germany will accept higher inflation. Hyper-inflation
leaves a lasting imprint on a country’s collective conscience, and
Germans are continually berating the deficit countries for their fiscal
profligacy. Furthermore, the European Central Bank is well known for
its hawkish tendencies. It recently raised interest rates, despite continued
high unemployment. In the release accompanying the decision to raise
rates, the ECB noted that the increase was driven by transient food and
energy price increases, and that long-term inflation expectations remained
well anchored (ECB 2011, 37).
The second way to achieve real devaluation is through normal
inflation in the North and deflation in the South, called an internal
devaluation. Even with a spoonful of sugar, this is some bitter medicine.
Irving Fisher (1933) long ago described why deflation is harmful to an
economic recovery: the price level falls while debts are almost always
contracted in nominal terms. Deflation raises the real value of debt, often
leading to bankruptcy. And in a recession following a period of excessive
borrowing, the pain will be particularly acute.
But what choice do these countries really have? Assuming they
desire growth, they need either higher spending (consumption or
investment, private or public) or more exports. We can quickly rule out

44

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2011

higher spending by the public sector. The Greek, Irish, and Portuguese
governments have already been shut out of international debt markets;
Spain may join them. Households in Spain and Ireland are reeling from
a property bubble, and Greece and Portugal had low savings rates going
into the crisis. Furthermore, any spending growth would have to be
financed by yet more Current Account deficits. Some of the debts may
need to be written off, but Europe’s banking system is already fragile.
There really isn’t an easy solution, but an internal devaluation may be the
least-worst option.

IV. Policy Recommendations
It is clear that policies will need to change in Europe at both the national
and continental level.
At the continental level, Current Account deficit and surplus limits
ought to be examined. The Stability and Growth Pact’s limits on public
borrowing were insufficient. Before the crisis Eurocrats could (and did)
claim that the imbalances reflected an inter-temporal optimization
problem. Now, statements like
[g]iven our assumptions, all generations, in both countries,
consumed their own endowment in the initial equilibrium. In the
equilibrium after monetary unification such solution is still part
of the opportunity set for all households. Hence, agents can only
gain from engaging in inter-temporal trade. (Fagan & Gaspar,
2008, 7)
rightfully elicit a raised eyebrow. To say that because imbalances only
increase the available consumption and saving patterns for Eurozone
residents, they are therefore necessarily not harmful suggests one has
spent a little too much time staring at models.
To his credit, Jean-Claude Trichet, the current President of the
European Central Bank, has acknowledged the problems posed by
Current Account imbalances within the Eurozone. He offers seven
indicators that the European Central Bank staff now view as “key.” They
are:
#a long-term measure of the growth of unit labour costs;
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#the stock of a country’s net external debt as a ratio to GDP;
#the national inflation rate;
#the current account deficit as a ratio to GDP;
#the private and government debt ratios;
#and the stock of private sector credit. (Trichet, 2011)
All of these are at least indirectly related to the Current Account, and are
sensible recommendations. To this I would add a stronger central
regulator of Europe’s banking system, with an eye toward systemic risk.
At the country level, adjustment will be needed too. Exiting the Euro
is essentially out of the question. If a country were to announce plans to
leave, the “mother of all financial crises” (Eichengreen 2007) would
ensue. Bank runs would occur as households and investors transfer their
savings to other Euro banks, knowing that the currency replacing the Euro
would immediately depreciate.9
To attain growth, deficit countries will need to move to Current
Account surplus. Today’s surplus countries could help by moving to
deficit. Doing this without encroaching on personal liberties is not easy.
No one blames Germany for making excellent products at low cost and
selling them abroad. Some do blame Germany for not consuming
enough10 , but its population is aging and preparing for retirement. The
public sectors could aid by continuing expansionary fiscal policy where
possible.
The European Central Bank should reverse its decision to tighten
monetary policy, or at the very least commit to not raising rates in the
near future. If the Northern core does not have higher inflation, the
solution looks unworkable.
Deficit countries will need to continue efforts to restore
competitiveness. They should follow the model set by Germany, who
achieved a real devaluation in the 1990’s through wage negotiations with
the unions (Black 2010). The two situations, however, could hardly be
more different. Germany’s institutions were favorable to a devaluation,
and they accomplished it in a much more amicable global environment.
Countries like Spain, where the local and regional governments control
more spending, will have a difficult time. Additionally, Germany’s
devaluation was matched by appreciations and Current Account deficits
in the South. Again, the South cannot bootstrap its way to recover; it will
need help.
Perhaps most importantly, European leaders will need to address

46

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2011

Europe’s banking sector head-on. The current policy is essentially a
backdoor bailout of the banks via bailouts of member-states (O’Rourke
2011). This is not a costless charade because if you consider a debt
restructuring possible, which looks likely for Ireland and inevitable for
Greece, any delay is harmful for the defaulting country. Europe’s
banking system will need to raise capital, and Europe’s policy makers will
need to force them to do it. Once the banks have recapitalized the
sovereign debts can be restructured, lightening the burden for the debtor
states.

V. Conclusion
The persistent Current Account deficits of Southern European economies
reflected inherent weaknesses in the Eurozone. The hoped for
convergence of incomes and productivity have not yet emerged. Inflation
was persistently higher in the South, eroding the competitiveness of their
exporters. The debt accumulated with Current Account deficits will be
difficult to service, especially when considering that much of the
borrowed funds went to finance consumption. Europe will need to first
recognize the problem, and then work together to solve it if the Euro’s
slow-motion train wreck is to end.
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Endnotes
1.

Over the same period we saw large Current Account imbalances develop between the
U.S., the U.K., Asia (mostly China), and the oil exporting countries. This “uphill”
capital flow from poor to rich countries required some mental gymnastics to fit into
the standard framework. It must have been reassuring for economists to see capital
flowing “properly” from richer to poorer countries in Europe. See Prasad et al.
(2007) for musings on this conundrum.
2. For a more rigorous definition, see the IMF’s Balance of Payments Textbook (IMF
1996, 29). Basically, there are other changes affecting the value of investments, such
as currency fluctuations, asset price changes, debt write-offs, etc.
3. Additionally, there is some concern about the effect Ireland’s tax policy has on its
GDP. Ireland has a very low corporate tax rate, which encourages multinationals to
move their profits through Ireland. This raises Ireland’s GDP but not its Gross
National Product, producing an uncommonly large gap between the two. Because
the corporate tax rate is so low, it doesn’t really generate much revenue. Thus,
comparisons like CA/GDP may be misleading. See Boone and Johnson (2010) for
more.
4. The IMF describes the computation of Real GDP adjusted for Terms of Trade effects
as “deflating exports with the import deflator rather than by their own deflator. Thus,
TOT-adjusted GDP indicates the volume of goods and services that can be
commanded by the goods and services produced by an economy (also called
“command-basis GDP”)–a concept arguably more relevant to the measurement of
living standards in open economies than conventional GDP.” (Bennett, et al. 2008).
5. See Fagan and Gaspar (2008) or Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010).
6. Yes, “sufficient investment” is vague, but deliberately so. The purpose here is to
dispute the assumption that current account deficits are invested in productive uses,
not to recommend the optimal mix of tradable and non-tradable investment.
7. See Lommatzsch and Tober (2006) for a view supporting B-S effects.
8. For example: Fiscal Policies (Harashima 2011), heterogenous wage formation
(Anderson 2008), demand expansion (López-Salido et al. 2005), country specific
shocks (Stavrev 2007), or even suggesting that inflation differentials are not actually
persistent (Gregoriou et al. 2010).
9. Krugman (2010) counters by arguing that if your country is already in a financial
crisis, quitting the Euro may actually not be so catastrophic, relative to where you
already are. We’ll take it for granted that the Southern countries will remain on the
Euro.
10. See, for example, Martin Wolf (2010) who argues that if Germany wants Southern
countries to save more, as it has stated, Germans themselves will have to save less.

